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as the "demander of last resort:" a 1% increase in the lagged US current account deficit is associated
with 0.5% increase of current account surpluses of countries running surpluses, but with insignificant
changes of current account deficits of countries running deficits. Overall, the panel regressions account
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over the next six years, projecting a large drop in its account/GDP surpluses.
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1.  Introduction 
The literature dealing with global imbalances focused attention on the enigma of the 
“poor” financing the “rich,” as exemplified by the patterns of China’s and US current account 
balances during the 1990s and the early 2000s.
1  The onset of the subprime crisis, its 
deflationary impact on the US, and the resultant recessionary pressure facing other countries 
suggests the unsustainability of the previous patterns.
2  We evaluate this conjecture in panel 
regressions that accounts for the US role as a “demander of last resort,” controlling for other 
variables suggested by the literature.  As China would be a key player in the adjustment of 
global imbalances, we also assess the degree to which Chinese current account patterns are 
accounted for by our panel regressions, and project possible future Chinese current account 
paths.   
The variables suggested by the literature include economic performance [like 
GDP/Capita growth and levels, etc.], economic structure and openness [trade openness and 
composition of exports, financial openness and external wealth, etc.], demographic [age 
dependence], exchange rate regimes and liquidity, sudden stops history, and others [see the 
World Economic Outlook, WEO (2008) for further discussion and detailed references].   As 
the US played the pivotal role as the “demander of last resort” during recent decades, it makes 
sense to add lagged US current account deficits to the list of variables explaining current 
account patterns of other countries.
3  We identify a large but asymmetric effect of the US role 
as the demander of last resort: a 1% increase in the lagged US current account deficit is 
associated with 0.5% increase of current account surpluses of countries running surpluses, but 
with insignificant changes of current account deficits of countries running deficits.  We 
                                                 
1 Further discussions on the sustainability of global imbalances can be found in Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2004), Cooper (2005), Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006), 
Roubini (2006), Setser (2006), Edwards (2004, 2005, 2007), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), Ju 
and Wei (2007a), Chinn and Ito (2005), and Aizenamn and Yi (2008).  
2 See IMF’s World Economic Outlook (October 2008) for a discussion of the challenges 
facing the global economy, and recent current account patterns. 
3 Aizenman and Yi (2008) report that during recent years the US current account deficits 
accented well above half of the global current account deficits.    2
control for all these variables in panel regressions of 69 countries during 1981-2006.   Overall, 
not more than 2/3 of the variation is accounted for by regressions that include fixed effects, 
and China’s fixed effect coefficient is insignificant.  Ranked by their economic impact on 
China’s current accounts (% of GDP), the most important variable is the lagged US current 
account deficit, followed by its own GDP growth, trade openness, bank credits/GDP, age 
dependency, net foreign assets/GDP, financial openness, and commodity exports/GDP. 
We apply the regression analysis to project the future patterns of China’s current 
account under two extreme scenarios.  The first case is where all the conditioning variables 
would be impacted by one standard deviation shocks during the next six years in ways that 
would increase China’s current account surplus; as would be if a global and domestic boom 
were to take place.  The second scenario is the opposite –all the conditioning variables would 
be impacted by one standard deviation shocks in ways that would decrease China’s current 
account surplus; as would be the case if a global and domestic recession were to take place.   
These two scenarios provide us with a band of plausible future paths.  We compare the 
resultant band with the latest WEO’s forecast of Chinese future current account, inferring that 
the WEO’s projections may be overly optimistic, forecasting the continuation of high current 
account surpluses.  We conclude with a discussion of these results.      
   
2.  Data and Estimation 
Our data on current account balances and macroeconomic factors cover 1981-2006.  
Most of the data (details documented in Appendix A) are taken from the World Development 
Indicators, the International Investment Positions, the External Wealth of Nations, and the 
World Economic Outlook, supplemented with Chinn and Ito (2006)’s capital account 
openness index, Shambaugh (2004)’s pegged exchange rate indicators, and our own 
calculated deviation from PPP implied by the penn effects [see also Aizenman (2008)] and 
sudden-stop indicators.
4  The net foreign asset data are available for a limited number of 
                                                 
4 For the literature supporting the effects of these macroeconomic factors on the current 
accounts, see Cavallo and Frankel (forthcoming) for sudden-stop indicators; Helliwell (2004), 
Higgins (1998), De-Santis and Lührmann (2006), and Taylor (2002) for the effect of aging on 
current accounts; Chamon and Prasad (2007) for the impact of age dependency and saving of   3
countries.  In addition, we include countries with at least ten annual observations to allow for 
subsequent division of the whole sample into sub-periods.  After pooling all the relevant 
variables, we have 69 countries (of which 21 are OECD, tabulated in Appendix B). 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the constructed sample for our estimation.  
Following the literature, we use these standard macroeconomic factors to estimate   
  
  {} 1, 1 1 6 9 ;, . . . , it it i USAt it i CAB X C CAB C c c βφ ε −− ′ =+ − + ≡  (1) 
 
where CABit is the current account balances of country (as % GDP) i at time t, and Xit-1 is a 
vector of macroeconomic factors, and  {} 16 3 ,..., i Cc c ≡  is a vector of country fixed effects.  
We include the US current account deficits (as % GDP) variable since the US acted frequently 
as the demander of the ‘last resort.’  Another frequently cited notion is that due to the growing 
size of China, the size of the US current account deficits may impact Chinese ability to run 
surpluses [see also Aizenman and Sun (2008)].   
 
2.1  Baseline results and alternative specifications 
Table 2 presents our baseline results.  The estimation explains about 54 to 66 percent 
of the current account variation from 1981-2006.  The variables appearing robust across the 
specifications can be categorized as those affecting current account surpluses in the following 
ways: 
•  Positively -- net foreign assets to GDP,
5 sudden stops of capital inflows, US 
current account deficits, trade to GDP. 
•  Negatively -- growth of GDP, age dependency, commodity exports to GDP, 
bank credits to GDP, capital account openness. 
                                                                                                                                                          
households in China; and Chinn and Prasad (2003), Chinn and Ito (2007), Aguiar and 
Gopinath (2007), and Gruber and Kamin (2007) for standard determinants of the current 
accounts. 
5 The net foreign asset position at time t is the initial position plus the cumulative current 
account and cumulative net capital gains on cross-border positions.   4
The last two columns of Table 2 show that the impacts of these macroeconomic 
factors differ between countries running current account deficits (specification [4a]) and 
countries running surpluses (specification [4b]).  Essentially, the effects of the US current 
account deficits are important only to the countries running surpluses.  In addition, the impact 
of net foreign assets, age dependency, commodity exports, bank credits are statistically 
significant only in the deficit countries. 
We also experimented with other specifications, with and without country fixed 
effects and excluding lagged US current account deficits.   The estimates reported in Table 3 
confirm the effects and signs of the standard macroeconomic determinants of our baseline 
specification.  Overall, the estimates are stable across country groups and sample periods, as 
presented in Table 4.  The negative impact of age dependency is larger in the OECD during 
1981-1994, but has become more important on the developing countries for 1995-2006.  The 
negative effects of bank credits are larger in the OECD, whereas the negative effect of capital 
account openness is more significant in the developing countries and during 1995-2006.  The 
positive effects of net foreign assets are larger in the developing countries and during 1995-
2006.  The effects of sudden stops are more significant in the developing countries, and 
during 1995-2006.  The positive effect of trade openness is larger for OECD countries.  The 
positive effects of US current account deficits are larger on developing countries and during 
1981-1994. 
 
2.2  China’s current account surpluses 
We now focus on China.  Figures 1-a and 1-b plot Chinese predicted current account 
balances based on our preferred specification [4] in Table 2 and alternative specifications in 
Table 3, respectively.  The actual values are mostly larger than predicted by our estimation 
without the country fix effects (though the fit improves by adding country fixed effects),  
suggesting that for one or several of the conditioning variables, a significant part of China’s 
current accounts remains unexplained throughout most of the period.  This also implies 
potentially the need to have non-linear effects, or that there is a unique, time persistent, 
Chinese effect, not captured by the conditioning variables.  To answer this question, we 
proceed in two steps.   5
First, we plot in Figure 2 the country fixed effects from the baseline specification [4] 
in Table 2.  Though China’s country fixed effect is positive, it is small and statistically 
insignificant.  During 1981-2006, industrial countries including Switzerland, Japan, and 
Norway registered significantly large average country fixed effects.  Developing countries 
with positive and larger country fixed effects than China include Egypt, Chile, Venezuela, 
Syria, Bolivia, and India. 
Second, we examine the relative importance of the various conditioning variables in 
accounting the current account variation.  Figure 3 presents the effects of +1s.d change of 
macroeconomic factors.  Based on the coefficient estimates from specification [4] in Table 2, 
the effects are calculated by multiplying the regression coefficient by the one standard 
deviation of the variable for each country group.  For instance, the coefficient estimate of 
NFA/GDP is 0.024; one standard deviation of NFA/GDP for Developing countries excluding 
China is 63.929; the economic significance of +1 s.d. change of NFA/GDP on the current 
account surpluses of Developing countries excluding China is 0.024x63.929=1.534.  For each 
of the macroeconomic factors, we can see in Figure 3 that their economic impact on the 
current accounts of China tend to be smaller than on the current accounts of other developing 
countries and the OECD.  Interestingly, the size of the US current account deficits has 
equivalent impact on the ability to run the current account surpluses of China as well as other 
country groups.  Ranked by their economic significance (in absolute term) on China’s current 
accounts (% of GDP), the most important variable is the US current account deficits (+.68%), 
followed by GDP growth (-.67%), trade openness (+.57%), bank credits/GDP (-.27%), age 
dependency (-.24%), net foreign assets/GDP (+.20%), financial openness (-.07%), and 
commodity exports/GDP (-.06%). 
 
2.3 Possible  adjustments 
Figure 4 plots China’s current account balances during 1984-2006, and our projections 
of the “good” and “bad” scenarios for the years 2007-2013, supplemented by the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook (October 2008) forecast.  Based on the estimation results [4] and 
the projection of each macroeconomic factors xi using ARMA(1,2) from the Chinese data 
1984 to 2006, the line with marker ‘+’ plots the “good 1 s.d. scenario,” where each of the 
conditioning variables gets a 1 s.d. shock that will increase current account surplus [if the   6
impact of a variable xi on the current account balance is +, then the shock to xi is + 1 s.d., if 
the impact of xi on the current account balance is negative, then the shock to xi is - 1 s.d.].  
The second scenario is the opposite, the “bad 1 s.d scenario,” where each of the conditioning 
variables gets a 1 s.d. shock that will reduce current account surplus.  In essence, we set t = 
2006; in the “good scenario” we assume that during t+ 1, t+2, t+3, ..., t+7, each year 1 s.d. 
“good shocks” will materialize.  Similarly, in the “bad 1 s.d. scenario” we assume that in each 
of the subsequent years, 1 s.d. “bad currant account shocks” will materialize.  For the “bad 1 
s.d. scenario,” we find that China’s current accounts to GDP will be between 1-2% surpluses.  
In contrast, in the “good 1 s.d. scenario,”  China’s current account surpluses will fluctuate 
around 8-9%, which is about 2% lower that the estimates by IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
(October 2008).  For both the good and bad scenarios, China’s current account surpluses are 
expected to decline over the 2007-13 periods. 
What is the impact of halving the US deficit?  The US deficit was about 731 billion 
USD in 2007 (about 5.3% of US 2007 GDP).  Based on the preferred specification [4b] in 
Table 2 using 1981-2006 data, the coefficient estimate of the US current account deficits is .5, 
statistically significant at 1 percent level.  This implies that halving the present US current 
account deficits/GDP will translate into about a (2.65 % x .5) = 1.3% reduction of China’s 
current account surpluses.
6  Using our estimates, we can evaluate the combined effect of 1% 
US current account deficit reduction on the balances of all the countries running current 
account surpluses.  We apply specification [4b], Table 2, and estimate the aggregate current 
account adjustment as a result of ‘a 1% reduction of US current account deficit to GDP.’  The 
                                                 
6 It turned out that the Dickey-Fuller test cannot reject the null hypothesis that China’s and US 
current accounts/GDP contain a unit root over the sample period; both series are I(1).  The 
residual series from fitting the Chinese series on the US series are not stationary.  This may 
reflect the low power of the test, suggesting that the relationship between the US and China 
current account balances to GDP cannot be explained by a simple cointegration, in isolation 
of other conditioning macroeconomic factors.  It is also consistent with the conjecture that 
CA/GDP ratio follows a unit-root process if its value stays within a certain range, but reverts 
to its long-run equilibrium when the CA/GDP ratio exceeds some threshold values [see Ju and 
Wei (2007b)].   7
absolute level of the ‘US deficit drops equivalent to 1% of US GDP’ is about 138 billion 
USD.   This adjustment would induce a drop of current account surpluses of China by 35 
billion USD, developing countries excluding China by 58.7 billion USD, and OECD countries 




3.  Concluding remarks 
  Our analysis confirms the importance of lagged US current account deficits in 
explaining the current account patterns of other countries.  Our projections of the current 
account of China in the next six years suggest a range of current account/GDP surplus 
bounded between 8-9% on the high end, and 1-2% on the low end.  In contrast, the latest 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) is in the range of 10-11%, well above our projections.  
While we are unable to comment directly on the IMF approach that provided this relative high 
projection, the deflationary pressure triggered by the US financial crises suggests that the 
WEO’s (October 2008) forecast may be off the mark, possibly because it ignores the global 
recession impact of the present crisis, and the pivotal role of the US as the “demander of last 
resort.”   
Indeed, one may argue that even in the absence of the recent financial crises, the 
anomaly of large countries growing much faster than the global mean, while running large 
and growing current account surpluses, leads to instability.  This may follow from the global 
adding-up property, where the sum of all current accounts is zero (up to statistical 
discrepancies).  The above anomaly can continue only as long as the deficit countries that 
grow, on average, at a much lower rate than China, will accommodate China by the needed 
increase in their current account deficit/GDP.  The US played this role of “demander of last 
resort” during 1990-2005, providing the needed accommodation to Chinese surpluses.  The 
                                                 
7 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Curcuru et al. (2008) note that owing to 
mismeasurement of net financial inflows, the US current account deficit could have been 
overestimated by as much as 0.6% per year.  The mismeasurement in financial flows and 
merchandise trade could be even more important to China.  A more complete investigation 
into this issue is beyond the scope of our study.   8
recent financial crisis may hasten the unwinding of the current account enigma, initiating 
recessionary pressure that induces the unwinding of US current account deficits.
  This 
conjecture is in line with Aizenman and Yi (2008), who report that during 1966-2005, 
excluding the US, the length of current account deficit spells is negatively related to the 
relative size of the countries’ GDP.  While one may argue that the EU would replace the US 
as a “demander of last resort,” there are no signs pointing in that direction.  EU’s aggregate 
current account (as % of GDP) was, on average, close to zero during 1990-2005, possibly 
reflecting political economy factors that constrained the EU’s external borrowing.  Short of 
changing these factors, the case for the emergence of new “demanders of last resort,” 
mitigating the drop of China’s current account surpluses, remains dubious. Consequently,
  one 
expects that China’s future current account surpluses may be constrained by the global 
adjustment, reducing them well below the 10% benchmark.  
    9
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Appendix A:  Data Sources 
 
WDI  ≡ World Development Indicators 
EWN ≡ External Wealth of Nations 
IIP     ≡ International Investment Positions 
 
Variable Database Database Code Sample Code
Current account balance (% of GDP) WDI BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS cab_gdp
Net Foreign Asset (% of GDP) EWN; IIP 79LADZF…; 79AADZF... nfa_gdp
Foreign Exchange Reserves (% of GDP) EWN; IIP 79AKDZF... fxres_gdp
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $; thousand) WEO PPPPC _gdc_cons_ppp
Growth of GDP, PPP (constant 2005 international $) WEO PPPGDP _gdp_cons_ppp_gro
Age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age population) WDI SP.POP.DPND age_dep
Population growth (annual %) WEO LP pop_gro
Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) WDI TX.VAL.MMTL.ZS.UN ores_exp
Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) WDI TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN fuel_exp
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) WDI FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS dcr_bank_gdp
Capital Account Openness Index Menzie Chinn and Hiro Ito kaopen kaopen
Pegged Exchange Rate Indicator Jay Shambaugh jspeg jspeg
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) WDI TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS trade_gdp
Average time to clear exports through customs (days) WDI IC.CUS.DURS.EX _time_cus
Average number of times firms spent in meetings with tax officials WDI IC.TAX.METG _time_tax
Sudden Stop at Year t; CA-L.CA > 0.03GDP authors' calculation n.a. ss0
Sudden Stop within the Previous 5 Years authors' calculation n.a. ss5
US current account deficits (% of GDP) WDI BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS usa_cab_gdp_def
Deviation from PPP implied by penn effects authors' calculation n.a. penn  12
 
Appendix B:  Countries (69) and Sample Period for the Estimation 
OECD Country Code Country Name
ARG Argentina 1981 2006
* AUS Australia 1981 2006
* AUT Austria 1981 2006
BEN Benin 1982 2002
BGD Bangladesh 1982 2004
BGR Bulgaria 1996 2006
BOL Bolivia 1981 2006
* CAN Canada 1981 2006
* CHE Switzerland 1996 2006
CHL Chile 1981 2006
CHN China 1984 2006
CMR Cameroon 1982 2004
COL Colombia 1981 2006
CRI Costa Rica 1981 2006
* DEU Germany 1981 2006
* DNK Denmark 1981 2006
DOM Dominican Republic 1981 2001
ECU Ecuador 1981 2006
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. 1981 2006
* ESP Spain 1981 2006
* FIN Finland 1981 2006
* FRA France 1981 2006
* GBR United Kingdom 1981 2006
GHA Ghana 1981 2004
* GRC Greece 1981 2006
GTM Guatemala 1981 2004
HND Honduras 1981 2004
IDN Indonesia 1981 2006
IND India 1981 2005
* IRL Ireland 1981 2006
* ISR Israel 1981 2006
* ITA Italy 1981 2006
JAM Jamaica 1981 2006
JOR Jordan 1981 2006
* JPN Japan 1981 2006
KEN Kenya 1981 2004
* KOR Korea, Rep. 1981 2006
LKA Sri Lanka 1981 2004
MAR Morocco 1981 2006
MDG Madagascar 1981 2004
MEX Mexico 1981 2006
MUS Mauritius 1990 2006
MWI Malawi 1981 2002
MYS Malaysia 1981 2006
NER Niger 1981 2005
NIC Nicaragua 1981 2005
* NLD Netherlands 1981 2006
* NOR Norway 1981 2003
* NZL New Zealand 1981 2006
OMN Oman 1981 2004
PAK Pakistan 1981 2006
PAN Panama 1981 2006
PER Peru 1982 2006
PHL Philippines 1981 2006
POL Poland 1990 2006
* PRT Portugal 1981 2006
PRY Paraguay 1991 2006
SEN Senegal 1981 2004
SLV El Salvador 1981 2006
* SWE Sweden 1981 2005
SYR Syrian Arab Republic 1981 2004
THA Thailand 1981 2006
TUR Turkey 1981 2006
TZA Tanzania 1997 2006
UGA Uganda 1994 2006
URY Uruguay 1981 2006
* USA United States 1981 2006
VEN Venezuela, RB 1981 2006
ZAF South Africa 1981 2006
Sample Period
   13
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
This table provides the summary statistics of the variables included in the analysis.  The variable 
description is in the Appendix A.  The statistics reported below are contemporaneous (year t), whereas the 
baseline estimation results use the lagged explanatory variables (year t-1). 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Current account balance (% of GDP) 1,544 -2.1 5.6 -42.9 17.6
Net Foreign Asset (% of GDP) 1,544 -42.1 57.8 -980.0 133.8
Foreign Exchange Reserves (% of GDP) 1,544 9.2 7.8 0.0 56.4
GDP per capita, PPP (thousand) 1,544 9.6 9.3 0.3 44.1
Growth of GDP, PPP (annual %) 1,544 6.5 4.0 -12.2 28.2
Age dependency ratio 1,544 65.8 17.5 38.8 112.4
Population growth (annual %) 1,544 1.6 1.3 -12.0 9.8
Ores and metals exports (% of exports) 1,544 6.5 11.4 0.0 80.1
Fuel exports (% of exports) 1,544 11.7 19.6 0.0 95.4
Domestic credit by banking sector (% of GDP) 1,544 75.5 55.9 4.4 442.6
Capital Account Openness Index 1,544 0.5 1.6 -1.8 2.5
Pegged Exchange Rate Indicator 1,544 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 1,544 49.2 24.8 10.1 199.5
Average days to clear exports through customs 1,544 4.3 3.4 1.4 15.6
Average times firms spent with tax officials 1,544 2.7 2.4 0.7 14.4
Sudden Stop at Year t; CA-L.CA > 0.03GDP 1,544 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0
Sudden Stop within the Previous 5 Years 1,544 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Deviation from PPP implied by penn effects 639 -1.2 26.9 -40.2 284.2  14
 
Table 2:  Baseline Results of Current Account Balances to GDP and Macroeconomic Factors 
This table reports the baseline estimation of  {} 1, 1 1 6 9 ; ,..., it it i USAt it i CAB X C CAB C c c βφ ε −− ′ =+ − + ≡ ; where CABit is the current account balances 
to GDP of country i at time t, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic factors as outlined in the Appendix A, and Ci is a vector of country fixed effects.  The regressions 
are OLS with country indicators (fixed effects).  Constant term and country indicators are not reported.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** (**,*) signifies 
statistical significant at 1 (5,10) percent. 
 
 
     est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  
Net Foreign Asset (% of GDP) .024 (.003) *** .010 (.006)         .024 (.003) *** .021 (.002) *** .008 (.008)  
Foreign Exchange Reserves (% of GDP) .013 (.022)   .025 (.027)   .039 (.023) *                  
GDP per capita, PPP (thousand) .003 (.031)   .143 (.040) *** .030 (.031)                    
Growth of GDP, PPP (annual %) -.215 (.025) *** -.188 (.036) ***       -.217 (.025) *** -.146 (.022) *** -.131 (.035) ***
Age dependency ratio -.052 (.022) ** -.119 (.032) *** -.084 (.021) *** -.054 (.019) *** -.048 (.019) ** .022 (.032)  
Population  growth  (annual  %) -.001 (.112)   -.316 (.197)                      
Ores and metals exports (% of exports) -.099 (.030) *** -.088 (.037) ** -.102 (.030) *** -.114 (.026) *** -.049 (.022) ** -.020 (.069)  
Fuel  exports  (%  of  exports) -.005 (.012)   -.014 (.016)                      
Domestic credit by banking sector (% of GDP) -.010 (.004) ** -.008 (.006)   -.010 (.005) ** -.010 (.004) ** -.014 (.004) *** -.006 (.005)  
Capital Account Openness Index -.225 (.107) ** -.421 (.131) *** -.183 (.110) * -.240 (.101) ** -.114 (.094)   -.205 (.175)  
Pegged  Exchange  Rate  Indicator -.351 (.281)   .241 (.313)                      
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) .051 (.010) *** .037 (.014) ** .024 (.010) ** .052 (.009) *** .001 (.009)   .038 (.013) ***
Average days to clear exports through customs .261 (.126) ** .335 (.138) ** .439 (.297)                    
Average times firms spent with tax officials .026 (.366)   .468 (.386)                          
Sudden Stop at Year t; CA-L.CA > 0.03GDP 3.801 (.288) *** 2.760 (.385) *** 3.773 (.296) *** 3.799 (.285) *** 1.647 (.292) *** 2.785 (.351) ***
Sudden Stop within the Previous 5 Years 1.028 (.233) *** 1.013 (.279) *** .962 (.240) *** 1.046 (.230) *** .297 (.204)   1.398 (.364) ***
US current account deficits (% of GDP) .403 (.073) *** .076 (.097)   .468 (.076) *** .409 (.069) *** .040 (.063)   .501 (.109) ***
Deviation from PPP implied by penn effects       .007 (.007)                          
R-sq. .663    .540    .622    .662    .699    .623   
Observations 1431    614    1490    1435    1003    432   
[4a] [4b]
OLS with lagged explanatory variables and country fixed effects
Countries Running Deficits Countries Running Surpluses
[4]
Current account balance (% of GDP)
[1] [2] [3]
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Table 3:  Alternative Specifications of Current Account Balances to GDP and Macroeconomic Factors 
This table reports the baseline estimation of  {} 11 6 9 ; ,..., it it i it i CAB X C C c c βε − ′ =+ + ≡ ; where CABit is the current account balances to GDP of country 
i at time t, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic factors as outlined in the Appendix A, and Ci is a vector of country fixed effects.  The regressions are OLS with and 
without country indicators (fixed effects).  Constant term and country indicators are not reported.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** (**,*) signifies 
statistical significant at 1 (5,10) percent. 
 
 
        est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  
Net Foreign Asset (% of GDP) .024 (.003) *** .009 (.006)  .050 (.005) *** .017 (.009) * .024 (.003) *** .021 (.006) *** .051 (.004) *** .025 (.008) ***
Foreign Exchange Reserves (% of GDP) .028 (.022)  .029 (.026)  .030 (.021)  .020 (.028)  .124 (.021) *** .123 (.027) *** .093 (.018) *** .088 (.026) ***
GDP per capita, PPP (thousand) .049 (.030)  .152 (.039) *** .064 (.026) ** .039 (.032)  .162 (.028) *** .275 (.041) *** .105 (.023) *** .097 (.033) ***
Growth of GDP, PPP (annual %) -.217 (.025) *** -.189 (.035) *** -.215 (.033) *** -.150 (.044) *** -.116 (.025) *** -.094 (.038) ** -.105 (.037) *** -.075 (.046)  
Age dependency ratio -.081 (.021) *** -.126 (.031) *** -.048 (.011) *** -.069 (.014) *** -.046 (.020) ** -.134 (.032) *** -.036 (.010) *** -.055 (.015) ***
Population growth (annual %) -.037 (.113)  -.333 (.196) * -.118 (.148)  -.166 (.176)  -.135 (.102)  -.430 (.204) ** -.231 (.131) * -.363 (.170) **
Ores and metals exports (% of exports) -.094 (.030) *** -.089 (.037) ** -.031 (.010) *** -.081 (.014) *** -.092 (.028) *** -.085 (.039) ** -.036 (.010) *** -.081 (.014) ***
Fuel exports (% of exports) -.000 (.012)  -.012 (.016)   .030 (.008) *** .008 (.010)  -.001 (.012)   .001 (.016)   .034 (.008) *** .017 (.011)  
Domestic credit by banking sector (% of GDP) -.007 (.004)   -.007 (.006)  .004 (.003)  .015 (.003) *** -.027 (.004) *** -.021 (.006) *** -.001 (.002)  .007 (.003) **
Capital Account Openness Index -.162 (.108)   -.417 (.131) *** -.108 (.098)  .132 (.105)   -.264 (.104) ** -.655 (.138) *** -.143 (.096)  .051 (.112)  
Pegged Exchange Rate Indicator -.336 (.284)  .269 (.311)  .289 (.265)  .629 (.295) ** -.276 (.279)  .291 (.325)  .405 (.253)  .558 (.293) *
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) .056 (.010) *** .037 (.014) *** .023 (.006) *** .005 (.008)  .036 (.010) *** .008 (.014)  .009 (.006)   -.007 (.008)  
Average days to clear exports through customs .262 (.128) ** .353 (.136) *** .194 (.039) *** .201 (.035) *** .274 (.125) ** .444 (.081) *** .182 (.036) *** .207 (.034) ***
Average times firms spent with tax officials .328 (.366)  .501 (.383)  .066 (.049)  .157 (.057) *** .215 (.351)  .391 (.310)  .025 (.048)  .094 (.060)  
Sudden Stop at Year t; CA-L.CA > 0.03GDP 3.790 (.291) *** 2.747 (.384) *** 3.730 (.424) *** 2.133 (.530) *** 3.624 (.287) *** 2.790 (.396) *** 3.616 (.425) *** 2.254 (.519) ***
Sudden Stop within the Previous 5 Years 1.116 (.235) *** 1.019 (.279) *** .775 (.244) *** .460 (.316)  1.013 (.227) *** 1.137 (.286) *** .569 (.243) ** .496 (.310)  
Deviation from PPP implied by penn effects      .006 (.007)        -.002 (.005)        -.006 (.007)        -.006 (.006)  
R-sq. .656    .540    .488    .371    .657    .533    .500    .374   
Observations 1431    614    1431    614    1544    639    1544    639   
OLS
[5] [6] [7] [8] Current account balance (% of GDP)
Lagged Explanatory Variables Contemporaneous Explanatory Variables
OLS with Country Fixed Effects OLS
[9] [10] [11] [12]
OLS with Country Fixed Effects
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Table 4:  Country Groups and Sample Periods of Current Account Balances to GDP and Macroeconomic Factors 
This table reports the baseline estimation of  {} 1, 1 1 6 9 ; ,..., it it i USAt it i CAB X C CAB C c c βφ ε −− ′ =+ − + ≡ ; where CABit is the current account balances 
(as % GDP) of country i at time t, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic factors as outlined in the Appendix A, and Ci is a vector of country fixed effects.  The 
regressions are OLS with and without country indicators.  Constant term and country indicators are not reported.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** (**,*) 
signifies statistical significant at 1 (5,10) percent. 
 
 
        est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  est. (s.e.)  
Net Foreign Asset (% of GDP) .011 (.019)  .022 (.004) *** .008 (.008)  .029 (.009) *** .016 (.007) ** .026 (.003) *** .021 (.003) *** .028 (.006) ***
GDP per capita, PPP (thousand) -.047 (.081)  -.637 (.345) * -.114 (.094)  -.260 (.319)   .072 (.038) * -.323 (.134) ** -.097 (.075)  -.161 (.075) **
Growth of GDP, PPP (annual %) -.241 (.062) *** -.155 (.042) *** -.278 (.073) *** -.229 (.044) *** -.232 (.049) *** -.195 (.030) *** -.179 (.034) *** -.244 (.036) ***
Age dependency ratio -.273 (.092) *** -.095 (.064)   .110 (.129)  -.291 (.080) *** .043 (.047)  -.116 (.028) *** -.055 (.043)  -.170 (.056) ***
Population growth (annual %) -.561 (.442)  .028 (.158)   -1.245 (.378) *** .460 (.228) ** -1.359 (.302) *** .084 (.130)  .013 (.135)  .208 (.190)  
Ores and metals exports (% of exports) -.127 (.192)  -.195 (.065) *** -.651 (.262) ** .010 (.053)  -.417 (.149) *** -.093 (.033) *** -.157 (.055) *** .001 (.047)  
Fuel exports (% of exports) .140 (.060) ** -.028 (.018)  .382 (.081) *** .152 (.042) *** .139 (.044) *** -.011 (.013)   -.018 (.015)  .175 (.035) ***
Domestic credit by banking sector (% of GDP) .012 (.011)   .015 (.010)  -.013 (.006) ** -.012 (.015)  -.020 (.005) *** .003 (.007)   .012 (.007)  -.011 (.008)  
Capital Account Openness Index .157 (.288)   .088 (.331)   .271 (.324)  -.804 (.221) *** .106 (.163)  -.402 (.139) *** .369 (.230)  -.610 (.180) ***
Pegged Exchange Rate Indicator -.291 (.593)  -1.137 (.552) ** -1.180 (.568) ** .490 (.624)   -.980 (.413) ** -.307 (.376)   -.607 (.419)   .065 (.463)  
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) .161 (.041) *** -.011 (.024)  .079 (.025) *** .015 (.022)  .104 (.020) *** .038 (.012) *** .008 (.019)  .035 (.017) **
Average days to clear exports through customs .157 (.773)  .491 (.359)   -.113 (.904)   -.865 (.363) ** -.255 (.530)  .292 (.182)  .402 (.181) ** -.844 (.264) ***
Average times firms spent with tax officials .000 (.000)  -.365 (.299)   .000 (.000)  -.191 (.360)   .000 (.000)  -.348 (.166) ** -.446 (.627)   1.388 (.638) **
Sudden Stop at Year t; CA-L.CA > 0.03GDP .456 (.587)  3.879 (.469) *** 2.928 (.678) *** 4.688 (.494) *** 1.727 (.495) *** 4.350 (.348) *** 3.011 (.369) *** 4.259 (.403) ***
Sudden Stop within the Previous 5 Years -.299 (.390)   .299 (.502)  1.173 (.413) *** 2.014 (.419) *** .682 (.310) ** 1.008 (.312) *** .258 (.345)  1.802 (.320) ***
US current account deficits (% of GDP) .160 (.128)  .483 (.167) *** .240 (.213)  .239 (.213)  .042 (.099)  .523 (.099) *** .482 (.111) *** .366 (.150) **
R-sq. .619    .692    .880    .730    .698    .655    .680    .766   
O b s e r v a t i o n s 2 7 0   4 2 7   2 5 1   4 8 3   5 2 1   9 1 0   6 9 7   7 3 4  
OECD Countries Developing Countries 1981-1994 1995-2006 Current account balance (% of GDP)
[17] [18] [19] [20]
1981-1994 1995-2006
[13] [14] [15] [16]
OECD Countries Developing Countries OECD Countries Developing Countries  17
Figure 1-a:  The Predicted v. Actual Current Account Balances (% of GDP) of China, Including US 
Current Account Deficits as an Explanatory Variable 
This figure plots on the vertical axis the predicted values and on the horizontal axis the actual values of the 
current account balances (% of GDP), based on the OLS estimation with country fixed effects, including 
US current account deficits as an explanatory variable (specification [4]).  The estimating equation is 
{} 1, 1 1 6 9 ; ,..., it it i USAt it i CAB X C CAB C c c βφ ε −− ′ =+ − + ≡ ; where CABit is the current account 
balances of country i at time t, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic factors as outlined in the Appendix A, and 
Ci is a vector of country fixed effects.  The dash line is 45 degree.  The correlation is .8136. 
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Figure 1-b:  Comparing Predicted v. Actual Current Account Balances (% of GDP) across Empirical 
Specifications, Excluding US Current Account Deficits as an Explanatory Variable 
This figure plots on the vertical axis the predicted values and on the horizontal axis the actual values of the 
current account balances (% of GDP), based on the OLS estimation with and without country indicators.  
The estimating equation is  {} 11 6 9 ; ,..., it it i it i CAB X C C c c βε − ′ =+ + ≡ ; where CABit is the 
current account balances to GDP of country i at time t, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic factors as outlined 
in the Appendix, and Ci is a vector of country fixed effects.  The dash line is 45 degree. 
 
 
using Xit-1, without country fixed effects; 
correlation = .6986 
using Xit-1 with country fixed effects; 
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using Xit, without country fixed effects; 
correlation = .7074 
using Xit with country fixed effects; 
correlation = .8106 
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Figure 2:  Country Fixed Effects on Current Account Balances (% of GDP) 
This figure depicts the estimated country fixed effects  l {} 16 9 ,..., i Cc c ≡  , based on the OLS estimation 
with country indicators (specification [4]): 
{} 1, 1 1 6 9 ; ,..., it it i USAt it i CAB X C CAB C c c βφ ε −− ′ =+ − + ≡ ; where CABit is the current account 
balances (as % GDP) of country i at time t, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic factors as outlined in the 
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Figure 3: Economic Significance of +1 s.d. Change on Current Account Surpluses (% of GDP) 
This figure presents the effects of +1s.d change of macroeconomic factors.  Based on the coefficient 
estimates from specification [4] in table 2, the effects are calculated by multiplying each of the coefficients 
by a 1 standard deviation of the variable for each country group.  For instance, the coefficient estimate of 
NFA/GDP is 0.024; one standard deviation of NFA/GDP for Developing countries excluding China is 
63.929; the economic significant of +1 s.d. change of NFA/GDP on the current account surpluses of 
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Figure 4:  Projection of China’s Current Account Balances, 2007 – 2013 
This figure plots the actual and projected current account balances (% of GDP) for China for years 2007 to 
2013.  Based on the baseline results [4] and the projection of each xi from ARMA(1,2) using the actual data 
from 1984 to 2006.  The line with marker ‘+’ plots a best 1 s.d. scenario, where each of the conditioning 
variable gets a 1 s.d. shock that will increase current account surplus [if the impact of a variable xi on the 
current account balance is +, then the shock to xi is + 1 s.d., if the impact of xi on the current account 
balance is negative, then the shock to xi is -1 s.d.].  The second measure is the opposite, the "worst 1 s.d 






















Notes: WEO stands for the projections in the World Economic Outlook (October 2008), International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
 
 